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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores pandemic planning efforts across federal and state 
jurisdictions and how the absence of collaboration could have major consequences upon 
the population of the United States. How adequate are state and federal pandemic plans, 
and what must be done nationally to address common shortfalls? The methodology used 
a hybrid approach by combining a secondary analysis of available data with a modified 
case study approach. Analyzing the individual state plans and HHS’ Pandemic Influenza 
Plan revealed common deficiencies, and disclosed distinct functional areas where 
stringent collaboration across multiple jurisdictions and functional areas would mitigate 
the deficiencies and provide a blueprint for potential development into an all-hazards 
national catastrophe plan. This resultant comprehensive plan would provide a solid 
template for all stakeholders to use in further development of their individual plans, and 
additionally provide a mechanism to propagate proactive planning efforts among 
international disaster preparedness partners.  
.  
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Our country has been given fair warning of this danger to our homeland 
— and time to prepare. 
— U.S. President George W. Bush’s remarks on issuance of Department 
of Health and Human Services Report “Pandemic Planning Update III,” 
November 13, 2005. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Within the United States, there are numerous inconsistencies in how various 
jurisdictions plan for a major pandemic event within their area.  No two states have plans 
identical to neighboring states, nor is there congruence within federal agencies on 
specific details in preventing, mitigating, or recovering from a pandemic event.  These 
inconsistencies have the potential to impede major response and recovery operations.  
Furthermore, the failure to synchronize planning may manifest itself across all 
preparedness initiatives, whether the focus is pandemic influenza, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, or consequences from a deliberate act of terrorism.  
This paper explores pandemic planning efforts across state and federal 
jurisdictions and how the absence of collaboration could have major consequences upon 
the population of the United States.  Could a major pandemic incident decimate the 
population, and how might nationwide consistency in pandemic planning reduce that 
threat?  
Investigation of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina underscored 
the problems associated with a lack of coordination in planning and preparedness.  The 
disaster revealed that the preponderance of planning at all levels took place in a crisis 
environment, despite the fact that all levels of government had adequate time to prepare.1 
Were contingency plans ignored, or were they nonexistent?  Could this failure occur 
again during a nationwide pandemic event?  A comment made during the investigation of 
                                                 
1 “The Federal Response to Katrina: Lessons Learned,” White House Report, February 2006: 53-54. 
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the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina revealed the failings: “It seems that all 
too often, local, state, and federal leaders were planning in a crisis environment.”2  To 
minimize the loss of life and enhance the speed of recovery, planning coordination for 
catastrophes across multiple jurisdictions must be a national priority — well before the 
next incident occurs.3 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) response in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina offers an excellent example of the benefits in collaborative planning to coordinate 
extensive search and rescue operations, by both air and boat.  The USCG facilitated 
operations planning with FEMA and multiple out-of-area responders, effectively 
evacuating or rescuing more than 33,500 people over a 17-day period.4  
There is minimal collaborative effort in addressing the threat of any pandemic 
event, whether natural or induced by mankind, and this lack of coordinated planning has 
the potential to impact a significant portion of the United States population, either 
through primary, secondary, or tertiary orders of effect.  This research will attempt to 
determine whether a side-by-side comparison of existing plans identifies consistent or 
numerous planning shortfalls, and whether there is a need for federal involvement in 
planning collaboration across the United States.   
The federal government developed minimum guidelines for planning 
considerations to address an Avian Influenza Pandemic by publishing the Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Pandemic Influenza Plan.  A systematic analysis of existing 
state plans, focusing on producing an enhanced collaborative plan, will alleviate much of 
the uncertainty within crisis management practitioners.  In the highly chaotic yet 
unpredictable environment associated with a pandemic event, the need for consistent and 
coordinated pandemic planning necessitates a proactive approach.  
 
                                                 
2 U.S. House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina. October 19, 2005: 3. 
3 Ibid., 3-4. 
4 “Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina,” 
GAO Report to Congressional Committees, July 2006: 22-23. 
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B. OVERVIEW OF PANDEMIC THREATS 
The critical analysis of these guidelines and policies may provide evidence that 
the federal government failed to consider other pandemic scenarios outside the pandemic 
influenza threat, a consideration the states should address as they collaborate and modify 
their respective plans.  The UN held a conference on bio-terrorism threats and noted that 
bio-terrorists may manipulate naturally occurring diseases, such as avian influenza, to 
launch an unprecedented biological attack.  Advancements in life sciences and 
biotechnology are progressing rapidly, and these developments pose a significant threat 
to both national and international security.5   
A Congressional Research Service Report for Congress noted that both Congress 
and the CDC community recognized the potential for laboratory manipulation of 
influenza viruses, which could lead to an effective terrorist weapon.6  With reports of a 
rising accident rate in American biological labs handling numerous varieties of diseases, 
it may be only a short time before a disease agent is advertently released into the general 
population, and a pandemic may quickly ensue.7  A report on U.S. policies to reduce 
global biothreats highlights the lack of progress in coordinating medical capabilities to 
manage infectious disease with European or other allies, which would be as applicable to 
natural pandemics as it would be to acts of bio-terrorism.8  Known agents likely to be 
used in biological terrorism include smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia, and 
Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers, to name a few.9  A rational argument could be 
made supporting the concept that a community better prepared for a pandemic  
event would inherently be prepared for alternative threats, including a bio-terrorism 
                                                 
5 “UN Conference Focuses on Bio-Terrorism Threat,” VOA News, November 19, 2006: 1. 
6 “Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts,” Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress. November 10, 2005: 32-33. 
7 “U.S. labs mishandling deadly germs,”  Associated Press, October 2, 2007: 1-3.   
8 “Biological Terrorism, US Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats,” Partnership for a Secure America 
report. September 2008: 19. 
9 “Medical Preparedness for Terrorism and Other Disasters,” American Medical Association Report. 
February 21, 2008: 3. 
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incident or an accident resulting from an inadvertent release of naturally occurring  
or experimental viruses, including strains of influenza.  
With the potential for a major pandemic event striking within U.S. borders at any 
time, there is a very real need for a well-defined and well-coordinated strategy to address 
the shortfalls in planning efforts within both federal and state jurisdictions.  Failure to 
collaborate and strengthen planning for a pandemic event across jurisdictional boundaries 
will be a certain death sentence for many Americans, and constitutes a major tragedy that 
can be avoided with rapid and decisive action by those charged with custodianship of 
America’s public trust.   
1. Thesis Statement 
How adequate are state and federal pandemic plans, and what must be done 
nationally to address common shortfalls?   
2. Methodology 
This research utilized a hybrid approach by combining a secondary analysis of 
available data with a modified case-study approach. To that end, this research analyzes 
the federal Pandemic Influenza Plan, and will apply the breadth and depth of planning 
addressed in this federal plan against all state pandemic plans before making policy 
recommendations.   
C. LEAD-IN TO FOLLOWING CHAPTERS AND EXPECTATIONS 
The chapters that follow will review the literature surrounding pandemic planning 
from multiple sources, provide the background, process, selection and application of the 
analytical tool, and provide the assessment of state and federal pandemic plans against 
the analysis matrix.  The summary will provide recommendations and policy implications 
for improving pandemic planning across the United States.  At the conclusion of this 
paper, it will be apparent that the pandemic planning communities have consistent 
deficiencies, and the course of recommended action will alleviate much of the disparities 
within this domain.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter serves as a brief overview of the literature on pandemic planning, 
and is not meant to represent a comprehensive review of pandemic planning literature; 
rather, the intention is to highlight some of the key challenges directly related to 
pandemic planning.  For the purpose of this paper, pandemic planning encompasses those 
actions required at diverse levels of government to prepare for, mitigate, and recover 
from a pandemic event. These actions include, but are not limited to, establishing 
planning committees to develop strategies, coordinating response activities, facilitating 
reviews of medical preparedness, and developing recovery plans.   
During the examination of existing literature for this paper, it became obvious that 
there were differing perspectives on pandemic planning, depending upon communities of 
interest.  It is therefore prudent to divide the literature review into four sub-literatures to 
provide the proper perspectives within each separate sector. The sub-literatures are: 
 International Efforts and Issues,  
 Governmental Guidance and Reports,  
 Media and Advocacy Groups Reports, and  
 Reports and Research Papers from the Medical and Public Health 
Communities.   
A. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AND ISSUES  
Providing an extensive literature review of the collective efforts of the 
international community in its entirety regarding pandemic planning would certainly be 
beyond the scope of this paper, and would likely stand alone as a separate thesis topic.  In 
reviewing what the international efforts and issues are, it is noteworthy that United States 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Mike Leavitt acknowledged, in a 
statement upon the release of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan,  
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I am humbled by the enormity of the challenge that the global community 
confronts should there be a pandemic.  Public cooperation and global 
partnerships will be essential tools in fighting back and creating a constant 
state of readiness.  If together we take the steps necessary, we will be able 
to save the lives of millions of people in our country and the world.10   
Acknowledging the need for a collaborative international approach in pandemic 
planning is an important first step in giving legitimacy to the efforts of international 
organizations and other nations.  The international pandemic plans and articles examined 
for this paper depict examples of progressive planning efforts, mostly under the umbrella 
guidance provided by the World Health Organization (WHO).  
With the increase in reported cases of avian influenza (H5N1) among birds, and 
an alarming increase in the human infection from H5N1 among multiple foreign 
countries,  WHO has taken the lead in educating and collaborating — and not only with 
its member nations.  WHO also provides outreach programs to lesser-developed countries 
having neither the desire nor the motivation to join the WHO community.  WHO 
published several documents to provide as much pandemic planning as practical, at levels 
from strategic planning to local planning, and incorporated the insights and 
recommendations from the international community to provide legitimacy to their 
process and documents. WHO also advocates that the WHO global influenza 
preparedness plan  
should be used as a guide to inform and harmonize national and 
international preparedness and response before and during influenza 
pandemics  . . .and . . .countries should develop or update national 
influenza preparedness plans that address the recommendations made 
here.11  
WHO consistently instills a sense of urgency, calling for urgent intervention 
strategies and assisting in identification of priorities within the communities, 
                                                 
10 Pandemic Influenza Plan,  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/overview.html.  Accessed October 26, 2008: 1-2. 
11 “WHO global influenza preparedness plan,” Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance 
and Response, Global Influenza Programme. March 2005: 5. 
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recommending distinct courses of action during separate phases of a pandemic.12  While 
recognizing the priority of effort within individual countries will focus on their own 
populations first, WHO provides a situational assessment, highlighting six key facts:  
 The risk of a pandemic is great, 
 the risk will persist,  
 evolution of the threat cannot be predicted,  
 the early warning system is weak,  
 preventative intervention is possible, but untested, and  
 reduction in morbidity and mortality during a pandemic will be impeded 
by inadequate medical supplies.13  
Another key document produced by WHO for worldwide distribution is a new 
WHO checklist for influenza preparedness planning, emphasizing WHO’s efforts in 
updating information and communicating worldwide as a leading proponent of pandemic 
planning.14   With recent reporting of fatality rates as high as 80 percent in Indonesia,15 
and having also recorded almost half the reported fatalities from H5N1 worldwide,16  it is 
evident this densely populated Asian nation is the focus of significant international 
concern.  WHO continues to proactively monitor this development on a continuous basis. 
The government of Indonesia is coming to terms with the realization they may 
become the springboard for a worldwide influenza pandemic.  Indonesians recently 
engaged in a major avian influenza pandemic exercise to gain a better internal 
                                                 
12 “Responding to the avian influenza pandemic threat: Recommended strategic actions,” World 
Health Organization Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response Global Influenza Programme. 
2005: 1. 
13“Responding to the avian influenza pandemic threat,”  3-4. 
14 Ibid., 4. 
15 “More than 80 percent of Indonesia bird flu cases die,” Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN1325807520080813  Accessed August 13, 2008: 1. 
16 “Indonesia: Rampant bird flu raises pandemic risks,” USA Today. 
http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=Indonesia%3A+Rampant  Accessed 
March 19, 2008: 1. 
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understanding of the scope of their pandemic challenge.  With over five thousand 
participants, including government and law enforcement officials, doctors, and local 
villagers from the island of Bali,17 Indonesia indicated to the international community 
that it acknowledged the pandemic threat and was proactively engaging their population 
to enhance community awareness and public health preparedness.   
The World Health Organization also provided amble warning to its member 
countries with its list of things to know about pandemic influenza.  WHO points to the 
concern that major economic disruption will be due to high rates of employee illness and 
absenteeism, coupled with the closely meshed and interdependent systems of trade and 
commerce.18  WHO also proclaimed it will take the lead in alerting the world as the 
pandemic threat level increases, and will assess its close contacts with multinational 
ministries of health and various public health organizations, serving as an international 
surveillance platform.19  
On another continent, an outbreak of another deadly disease, with many of the 
flu-like symptoms such as high fever, nausea, diarrhea and headaches, took place last fall 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  The international community, led by the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), quickly determined the illness was an 
outbreak of Ebola, a naturally occurring pathogen with no known cure.20  
The manifestation of Pandemic Influenza in Indonesia and Ebola in Congo are but 
two examples of disease occurrence in developing countries.  Developing countries pose 
unique challenges to pandemic planning due to their remote locations.  They are cause for 
concern in light of several issues including delayed time in correctly identifying the 
                                                 
17 “Indonesians hold major drill for bird flu pandemic,” Associated Press. 
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5iHvsX7x_0-z19F7ydDjEt38m5qUAD908NBG02 Accessed April 25, 
2008: 1. 
18 “WHO: Ten things you need to know about pandemic influenza,” Eastern Idaho Public Health 
District article.  http://www.idaho.gov/phd7 Accessed July 31, 2008: 1. 
19 Ibid., 2. 
20 “Congo’s Ebola Outbreak Could Be Worst in Years,” Washington Post. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/18AR2007091801047_Accessed April 
17, 2008: 1-2. 
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disease, unknown spread among and within a population, and the effects the slow 
response has on the ability to execute a timely containment strategy.  
CDC recently identified several challenges to pandemic planning in developing 
countries, noting mortality rates in such countries could be significantly higher than in 
industrialized.  One study concluded that 96 percent of an estimated 62 million deaths 
resulting from a worldwide pandemic would occur within these developing countries, due 
in large part to limited healthcare resources and technical expertise, and inadequate 
infrastructure.  Most of these countries depend on donated funding and medical 
resources, which would likely be severely curtailed during a pandemic event.21   
In conjunction with other international efforts, the United Nations (UN) launched 
the International Partnership for Avian and Pandemic Influenza in September 2005.  The 
clear mandate was to encourage openness and facilitate a coordinated effort within the 
international community, including leveraging and mobilizing resources, improving 
surveillance, and building local capacity to identify, contain, and effectively respond to a 
pandemic influenza incident.22  While painting a mostly threatening picture of a 
pandemic influenza event, the United Nations also publishes good news, when warranted. 
Citing an “extraordinary global response” to the threat of an influenza pandemic, the UN 
finds the world better equipped to fight an influenza pandemic, with 160 nations having 
plans in place and disease-fighting pledges approaching $2.7 billion .23    
Even the World Bank has contributed to the worldwide pandemic planning efforts 
through an analysis of financing needs and gaps of a pandemic event, noting that a 
primary consideration of governments should be how to win the trust and confidence of 
their citizens in an effort to minimize public panic while mobilizing the communities as  
 
                                                 
21 “Major Issues and Challenges of Influenza Pandemic Preparedness in Developing Countries,” CDC 
Journal 14, Number 6. June 2008. http://www2a.cdc.gov?ncidod/ts/print.asp. Accessed October 26, 2008. 
22 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, One Year Summary, Homeland 
Security Council. July 2007: 6. 
23 “World better equipped to fight flu pandemic-UN,” Reuters UK. 
http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleID=UKN17372727._CH_242020080617. Accessed June 23, 2008: 
1. 
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partners to defeat the threat.  The World Bank strongly advocates for governments to 
adopt an honest and transparent public information policy to enhance public confidence 
in government.24    
England gives serious study to the potential for an influenza pandemic developing 
either internally or as an invasive threat to their national security.  A parliamentary 
committee projected 750,000 fatalities among Britons, and as many as fifty million 
people worldwide,  thus ranking an influenza pandemic among the top threats facing their 
nation.25  This same committee calls the World Health Organization “dysfunctional,” and 
calls for major reform to prevent a large pandemic influenza event.  Although significant 
advances have been made in disease control and prevention, as well as public health, the 
committee notes changes in lifestyle and globalization are providing key opportunities for 
diseases to spread quickly.26   
Korea took the initiative in a public proclamation of an insidious, yet very real, 
secondary order of effect from an influenza pandemic.  Korea noted that while the risk of 
an avian influenza pandemic continues to rise, it also represents a significantly bigger risk 
to the behavior of international stock markets, and perhaps a greater threat than any posed 
by a terrorist event.27   
In a recent twist to its standard military role, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) announced joining the Global Health Intelligence Network 
(GPGIN), an open-source material collection capability that monitors emerging 
pandemics and other global public health events.28  As the first military organization to 
                                                 
24 “Avian and Human Influenza: Financing Needs and Gaps,” World Bank. January 12, 2006: 4. 
25 Robert Roos, “Britain ranks flu pandemic among top threats,” CIDRAP News article.  
http://www.cidrap.news.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/panflu/news/aug0808pandemic.html  Accessed 
August 15, 2008: 1. 
26 “Britain faces 750,000 deaths in bird flu pandemic, Lords report predicts,” Guardian UK. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/21/pandemic.warning/print Accessed July 21, 2008: 1-2.  
27 “Avian Flu Update Bulletin Board – The latest News on the Avian Flu Pandemic,” Healthy, 
Wealthy and Wise Show. http://www.healthywealthyandwiseshow.com/Avian%20Flu.htm Accessed 
August 5, 2008: 3. 
28 “Analysis: NATO begins pandemic monitoring,” United Press International. 
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2008/01/30/Analysis_NATO_begins_pandemic_monitoring 
Accessed July 3, 2008:   1.    
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take this initiative, NATO sends a strong signal that a future influenza pandemic may 
have serious implications on the multinational military organization, and possibly on 
strategic security issues.    
Emphasis on the pandemic threat appears inconsistent across all domains, with the 
international community arguably leading the effort in pandemic preparedness and 
overall planning. This could be a direct result of the increasing number of H5N1 Avian 
Influenza infections occurring among citizens in developing countries, as well as many 
nations recognizing the potential enormity of a pandemic threat.  With significant funding 
to the international effort by the United States, and an aggressive campaign by the World 
Health Organization, many countries not only find time to plan for the pending threat, but 
they also practice at local, national, and regional levels.  In direct contradiction, the 
United States is still in its infancy regarding regional- and national-level exercises, thus 
the planning efforts have not been substantiated through exercise evaluation.  The 
analysis of foreign pandemic planning has implications applicable to state and local 
planners within the United States.  Perhaps the most valuable observation is that the 
international community still recognizes a pandemic threat, whereas many individuals in 
the American general public, and even among members of government at all levels, have 
become complacent to the threat of a pandemic event, regardless of the source of origin. 
The lack of continued public and governmental support toward pandemic planning and 
preparedness may ultimately impact continued federal funding for preparedness 
initiatives, and especially major regional exercises, as jurisdictions may perceive the 
costs as outweighing the benefits of proving their pandemic plans during a major 
exercise.   
It is important to recognize and comprehend the pandemic planning efforts across 
the international community as we rely on their efforts, especially in early detection and 
information sharing, to develop our last lines of defense against a pending crisis.  
Through early disease tracking and warning, the United States can implement strategies 
to prevent, impede, or mitigate the impacts of a pandemic before it strikes major 
population centers within our borders.      
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B. GOVERNMENTAL GUIDANCE AND REPORTS 
There is definitely no paucity in pandemic planning material produced and 
distributed by the United States government.  Dozens of plans and updates to plans have 
evolved over the past five years. This is a result of multiple factors such as gains in 
knowledge of the threat, advances in intervention strategies regarding anti-viral 
medications, demand for more planning involvement by agencies outside the federal 
government, a demand for more transparency in strategy development, and increased 
need for sustained communications across all sectors.  
With the initial publication, in November 2005, of the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza, President Bush drew national attention upon release of this 
framework, maintaining consistency with both the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security and the National Security Strategy.  The document’s thrust centered on the 
executive branch’s preparedness initiatives to address an emerging pandemic influenza 
threat, and delivered to the public the first comprehensive approach to the potential 
threat.29 The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza acknowledges that the nation 
must have a system of integrated plans across all levels of government to adequately 
address a pandemic threat.30  
As the designated lead agency for the national pandemic planning effort, as well 
as the responsibility for the federal medical response to bioterrorism attacks,  Health and 
Human Services published the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan to provide “a blueprint for 
all HHS pandemic influenza preparedness planning and response activities.”31 The 
Strategic Plan section provides for federal plans and preparation, and identifies key roles 
of HHS and its subordinate agencies during a pandemic event.  The section addressing 
public health guidance for state and local partners provides detailed guidance to state and 
local health departments.   
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With the publication of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Implementation Plan in May 2006, the Homeland Security Council clearly identified 
three principal policy goals resulting from the establishment of an effective and 
comprehensive planning  program: the survival of our constitutional form of government, 
the uninterrupted continuation of national-level essential functions, and the rapid 
resumption of all government functions and activities.32 Noting that organizations across 
all sectors and levels of government should plan for a pandemic, the key considerations 
for planning requirements to ensure continuity of operations include identifying essential 
functions, delegation of authority, orders of succession, alternate operating facilities, 
devolution of control and direction, reconstitution, and human capital, among others. The 
plan also clearly expresses the identification of the health threat to personnel as the 
primary threat to continuity of operations.33 Within the roles and responsibilities section, 
the Department of Health and Human Services is singled out as the agency responsible 
for the actions to protect the health of all Americans and provide essential human 
services. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) rapidly published several 
reports to provide transparency of its pandemic planning actions, and has published 
several Pandemic Planning Updates that show both the progress and deficiencies among 
federal agencies and state and local governments, highlighting many facets of planning 
and preparedness to benefit the overall community of interest. With the primary onus for 
priority of planning actions thrust upon the state and local jurisdictions, HHS addresses 
community-based public health interventions and effectively manages a publically 
available Web site for federal avian and pandemic influenza information, 
www.pandemicflu.gov .34  
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The office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, within HHS, 
provided key leadership in the development of a government-wide collaboration 
providing the Pandemic Influenza Strategic Plan, which codifies HHS’ public health and 
medical responsibility during a pandemic event. The plan also describes the steps federal 
departments will follow to address an influenza event either in the homeland or abroad — 
a major step toward delineating specific actions by different agencies.35  A quote from 
HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt highlights the importance of a collaborative approach to the 
multiple threats to be addressed, which cannot be the sole domain of the federal 
government to confront: “The Federal government cannot mount an effective response to 
the threats we face as a nation without partners at every level of government and 
throughout society.”36 The latest update from HHS, published in early 2008, expounds on 
the need for international cooperation to respond effectively to a pandemic, and stresses 
the relative successes among WHO member countries in coordinating both national and 
international responses to disease threats, including pandemics. HHS actively solicits 
nations to share samples of influenza viruses to assist in early international warnings of 
evolving strains.37 Reiterated within HHS’ Pandemic Planning Update V is the 
importance of state and local preparedness, and establishment of partnerships to include 
state agencies, local governments, and for-profit and not-for-profit private sector entities 
within each state, as a means for effectively preparing for pandemic influenza.38 
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for several publications 
regarding pandemic planning and preparedness. As early as 2007, it released Pandemic 
Influenza Best Practices and Model Protocols, which provides sound guidance and shares 
several best practices for supporting pandemic influenza planning. Noting the completion 
of planning and preparation efforts for a pandemic outbreak may have significant benefits 
and potential applications in addressing other emerging infectious disease outbreaks,39 
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the publication highlights planning assumptions and planning considerations to provide 
the target audience with planning tools to support their respective processes.40 
The Department of Homeland Security focused on a recurring theme among 
government publications — that preparedness is a shared responsibility.41 DHS indicated 
the National Preparedness Guidelines provided a consolidated framework derived from 
many different plans, strategies, and systems to advocate a preparedness cycle consisting 
of five primary actions: plan, organize and staff, equip, train, and exercise, evaluate, and 
improve to maximize community preparedness, especially by strengthening planning and 
citizen capabilities.42  
The National Preparedness Guidelines designates planning as one of the 
eight national priorities and as a target capability common across all 
homeland security areas. The capability to plan and a standard planning 
process are essential for the effective implementation and assessment of 
homeland security initiatives to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks or natural disasters. The security of the 
Nation requires that all levels of government possess the ability to develop 
standard, coordinated plans, and to identify and dedicate resources to the 
development of those plans. It is further imperative that such plans be 
regularly tested and improved through an inclusive and open system.43  
Also highlighted in the National Preparedness Guidelines is the need for 
synchronized and coordinated planning capability at all levels of state and local 
government. The Secretary of Homeland Security is specifically tasked to  
expand opportunities for education, training, and professional 
development for planning communities at all levels; identify opportunities 
within Federal homeland security preparedness programs, to foster 
effective synchronization of Federal, State, local, and tribal plans; and 
expand opportunities in the National Exercise Program to rigorously test 
and validate plans for a broader spectrum of the national planning 
community.44   
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The momentum initiated by the Department of Homeland Security in publishing 
guides and strategies resulted in other federal agencies developing internal strategies, and  
spurred the further development of national plans and strategies that address an 
interwoven relationship with the core Department of Homeland Security publications. A 
few examples reviewed for this study include the National Emergency Communications 
Plan (NECP), the Department of Agriculture Pandemic Planning Report, the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Strategic Plan, and the 
National Strategy for Information Sharing. In addressing the emergency communications 
deficiencies highlighted during the September 11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina and 
other natural disasters, and recognizing the potential repercussions during a pandemic, 
major natural or manmade disaster, or future terrorist attacks, the NECP seeks to improve 
technology, coordination, governance, planning, training, and exercises to enhance 
communications operability within agencies, as well as provide the critical cornerstone 
for building interoperability across all jurisdictions and other agencies.45  
Noteworthy within the other agency examples are clearly identified roles and 
responsibilities for the respective agency, and consistent recognition of the need to 
collaborate with external partners, whether foreign counterpart agencies and international 
organizations46 working within specific service infrastructures,47 or outreach to 
counterparts within federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign response 
partners.48 As evidenced with the core homeland security document, the primary goals 
reflected across all homeland security efforts, regardless of the catalyst, involve four 
basic goals:  
 prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;  
 protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key 
resources; 
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 respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; and  
 continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term 
success.49 
Significant numbers of directions and guidelines have been published from 
multiple agencies, including both the Department of Homeland Security and HHS, with 
the potential for substantial confusion among state planners on which guidelines to 
follow. HHS has been designated as the lead federal agency for the pandemic planning 
and preparedness campaign, thus state planners should ascribe to the methodology and 
guidelines HHS provides as a minimum. Using other guidelines as additional sources 
would provide states more options to develop more comprehensive pandemic plans. 
The release of the National Response Framework in March 2008 solidified the 
need for every level of government, communities, nongovernmental organizations, public 
and private sectors, and individuals to separately and collectively embrace the concept of 
a unified national response, including developing plans, conducting assessments, and 
providing capabilities and resources in a layered and mutually supporting fashion. 
Primary responsibility for the public health and welfare of citizens was directed to states, 
territories, and tribal nations, as these entities are closest to those impacted. Highlighted 
within the chapter on planning is the value of planning: “Planning provides two principal 
benefits: (1) it allows jurisdictions to influence the course of events in an emergency by 
determining in advance the actions, policies and processes that will be followed; and (2) 
it contributes to unity of effort by providing a common blueprint for activity in the event 
of an emergency. Planning is a foundational element of incident response and thus an 
essential homeland security activity. Emergency planning is a national priority, as 
reflected in the National Preparedness Guidelines. Planning activities under the 
Framework include the collection and analysis of relevant intelligence and information, 
and the development of plans, procedures, response capabilities, mutual aid agreements 
and other tools that operationalize relevant laws, policy and preparedness guidance 
necessary for incident response .”50 
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A unique federal, multi-agency approach to assist states in improving state-level 
pandemic influenza operating plans attempts to build on the progress the states made 
since the initial assessments were undertaken and incorporates a collective lessons 
learned by the various U.S. Government Departments. The new guidance focuses on 
operating plans “that manifest a) clear-cut operating objectives, b) definitive 
implementation strategies, c) unequivocal specification as to which organizations or 
individuals are responsible for which elements, and d) measurable performance 
objectives .”51  
Specifically highlighted in this collaborative guidance were three strategic goals: 
1) ensure continuity of operations of state and local agencies and state government, 2) 
protect citizens as the principal responder in the influenza pandemic, and 3) 
sustain/support 17 critical infrastructure and key resource sectors.52 Reiterated within this 
federal guide is the emphasis to include preparedness and planning, although these 
activities would not normally be included in an operating plan. The document further 
provides fundamental elements for successful preparation and inclusion into both plans 
and operations, including involving the state and local leadership, treating pandemic as an 
all-sectors issue (vice solely a health concern), collaborating with neighboring and distant 
states, and across society at the state level, engaging regional Principal Federal Officials 
for coordination of the federal response effort, and finally, addressing the individual 
citizens preparedness.53  
The Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human 
Services have also published guidance on pandemic issues under their combined banners. 
This collaboration signals the public that both agencies concur on critical findings and 
preventative and mitigation strategies regarding public health in general, and pandemic 
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influenza specifically.54 The agencies have also developed a Webcast, PlanFirst, to assist 
states, local communities, faith-based and civic organizations, and individuals learn more 
regarding pandemic planning.55   
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed multiple guides 
to facilitate pandemic planning, and serves in the pivotal role of coordinating public 
health matters throughout the United States, with internationally recognized expertise in 
all aspects of public health. With the release of interim pre-pandemic guidance, CDC 
offered communities the potential for utilizing nonpharmaceutical interventions to 
provide a basis for developing a comprehensive community mitigation strategy. 
Interventions recommended require advance planning, and emphasis toward community 
preparedness for cascading second- and third-order effects are also noted.56 An article 
published by the CDC remarked “…the H5N1 influenza threat is viewed with disturbing 
complacency; a frequently heard statement is ‘since the virus has not adapted to 
continuing human-to-human transmission by now, it is unlikely to do so in the future.’ 
Such complacency is akin to living on a geologic fault line and failing to take precautions 
against earthquakes and tsunamis.”57  As the primary organization charged to coordinate 
public health  throughout the United States, CDC is actively pursuing multiple angles to 
facilitate pandemic planning across all levels of government. CDC’s outreach extends to 
the production of Pandemic Influenza checklists and a nationwide system specifically 
designed to rapidly inform all agencies about any  public health emergencies, the Health 
Alert Network (HAN), which has been replicated within many states for their own 
internal applications.58 CDC also publishes press releases to keep the public informed of 
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any significant updates in the pandemic influenza arena, as they did in September 2008 
with the announcement of the awarding of 24 million dollars in pandemic influenza 
preparedness projects, which should serve to inspire innovative approaches in influenza 
pandemic planning or to spur accelerated, state and local planning efforts.59 In their 
internal organizational influenza pandemic operational plan, CDC provides their mission 
statement, indicating the necessary planning and actions required to successfully respond 
and mitigate pandemic effects, and that their guidance will also assist external agencies in 
better comprehension of operational planning.60 
Recent actions which were initiated within the interagency community led to the 
establishment of pandemic planning within the Department of Defense (DoD), with 
primary efforts geared toward developing plans to prepare for, detect, respond to, and 
contain the effects of a pandemic on military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contractors, 
dependents, and beneficiaries, while also providing assistance to both foreign and 
domestic civil authorities. Additionally, the planning effort also includes key security 
concerns which may result from a pandemic event, such as humanitarian relief and 
stabilization operations.61 Although DoD will prepare for and respond to all four focus 
areas described in the National Implementation Plan, DoD will also include a specified 
fifth task, that of support to international partners and international stability and 
security.62 Due to its primary roles of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, United 
States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was given the primary role of developing 
concept of operations plans to support the pandemic planning efforts for the entire DoD. 
Primarily concerned with continuity of operations, force protection, and providing 
support to civil authorities, USNORTHCOM also recognizes the need for a continental 
strategy and the need to work with Canada and Mexico to promote a unified North 
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American approach to pandemic planning.63 USNORTHCOM continues to be the lead 
DoD proponent and participant in major interagency and national level exercises, and 
consistently incorporates lessons learned to ensure pandemic plans remain effective and 
relevant.64 There are indications that the military planning community established a 
model for effective planning that other planning communities should emulate. “The 
leading roles assigned to DoD by the Homeland Security Council and approved by the 
President in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (NSPIIP), 
appear to indicate government recognition that the interagency may lack the capacity to 
conduct and execute effective operational planning, and that there is a need for DoD 
planning expertise to fill this gap. If this view is accurate, then it is recognized that 
military planning and execution processes and capabilities are not only different, but also 
more disciplined than conventional interagency planning methods .”65 “The armed forces 
of the United States live and die by their planning capabilities; therefore, the standards 
for military planning are inherently much higher than elsewhere in the interagency .”66 
“Several think tank organizations have expressed the need for improving the way our 
government approaches, conducts, and executes planning regarding all facets of 
government responsibility. They collectively acknowledge that one of the most critical 
government functions is protecting the nation’s security, and in this era of advanced 
technology and limited resources accomplishing this purpose requires all entities of 
government to mutually support each other effectively and efficiently .”67 State and local 
planners, while having somewhat differing priorities in their planning objectives,  may 
benefit from adopting the military planning process, as time and resources may be 
quickly depleted in developing a localized approach to pandemic planning.    
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Given the unique responsibility for evaluation and oversight of the governance 
and execution of federal plans, programs, and policies, the United States Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) arguably has the most extensive review of the national 
preparedness efforts, including those involving pandemic planning. Several GAO reports 
have highlighted key challenges that remain in pandemic planning despite the plethora of 
federal documents. One report called for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to evaluate the further 
development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, focusing on 
natural disasters, terrorist events, and an influenza pandemic by assessing capabilities at 
all levels of government, and also provide guidance and direction to ensure an integrated 
jurisdictional and regional approach in disaster planning.68 Another GAO report called 
for “the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services to work 
together to develop and conduct rigorous testing, training, and exercises for pandemic 
influenza to ensure that federal leadership roles are clearly defined and understood and 
that leaders are able to effectively execute shared responsibilities to address emerging 
challenges.”69  DHS and FEMA’s management of the National Response Framework 
(NRF) was the subject of another GAO study that revealed a disconnect in the proposed 
coordination publicized in the development of the document, specifically that DHS 
conducted an internal federal review and omitted providing a draft for comment to the 
non-federal stakeholders. GAO recommended that DHS fully engage non-federal  
stakeholders in the future as it continues to revise the NRF in the future.70 This outreach 
would facilitate coordination across the planning communities, and would enhance the 
perception of inclusiveness among all communities of interest. In testimony before the 
Committee on Homeland Security, William O. Jenkins, Jr. Director of Homeland 
Security and Justice stated “DHS’ efforts to develop operational plans to guide other 
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federal agencies’ response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities are 
incomplete. In addition, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the nation’s 
overall preparedness based on the Target Capabilities List (TCL) and has not yet 
developed a complete inventory of all federal response capabilities.”71 Key observations 
from a September 2008 report indicate HHS may face extreme challenges in having 
states and local jurisdictions implement nonpharmaceutical interventions which may 
drastically reduce the overall effectiveness of these interventions, recognizing that HHS 
has no authority to mandate jurisdictions comply with its guidance. Encouraging state 
and local jurisdictions to comply with nonpharmaceutical interventions will be even more 
challenging as HHS guidance does not indicate when implementation should begin and 
end, and HHS cannot effectively communicate how jurisdictions should convince 
residents to comply with state and local intervention guidance.72      
In an attempt to prepare states, businesses, families and local communities to 
address nonpharmaceutical intervention strategies, CDC issued a 108-page document, 
with a special note indicating the guidelines should be adjusted as necessary to meet the 
anticipated needs as a pandemic unfolds.73 Among the intervention strategies suggested 
was immediately closing schools as a method to limit transmission, with the projected 
reduction in peak attack rates dropping by 39 to 45 percent during a prolonged school 
closure.74 Much of the success from the social distancing strategies such as school 
closures relies on the personal efforts of citizens to protect themselves as much as 
possible, recognizing that this strategy, combined with antiviral drug applications, could 
significantly slow the spread of an influenza pandemic .75    
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A recent announcement by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services of 
an infusion of an additional 75 million dollars toward pandemic influenza response 
planning grants, as a substantial supplement to a previously announced 430 million 
dollars, will aid states in procuring essential medical supplies and equipment, and also 
assist in the continued development of pandemic planning efforts.76  Despite this infusion 
of federal funds, some public health experts highlighted the CDC’s reduction in overall 
funding for emergency preparedness since fiscal year 2006, when the funding dropped 
from 991 million dollars to 897 million dollars in fiscal year 2007, and a projected 609 
million dollars for fiscal year 2009.77 Whether this decline in federal funding will 
ultimately impact the next generation of pandemic planning initiatives is yet to be 
determined. 
As evidenced by the sheer volume of planning information available to the 
pandemic planning communities, it is easy to imagine that planners may be confused over 
which specific guidance to follow. Within their respective domains, communities are 
driven to plan according to the guidance of agencies under whose realm of influence they 
fall. State planners acknowledge that the single agency providing overarching guidelines, 
according to legislative mandate, is the Department of Health and Human Services. 
Savvy planners also recognize that no single plan is perfect, thus the planning community 
frequently reviews other similar plans and adopts those processes, techniques, and 
procedures that would be beneficial for inclusion in their base plan. The ability to glean 
the best guidance from the vast library of guides and transform the information into a 
hybrid plan to meet the states’ needs should be construed as a positive outcome rather 
than a confusing issue.  
Ensuring all available national capabilities and authorities produce response plans 
that are complementary and capable will require significantly integrated planning efforts 
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across both government and private sector environments. Without the planning and 
coordination information Health and Human Services is tasked to provide, agencies may 
develop plans which will be either ineffectual or irrelevant. It is imperative that each 
agency within the planning community plan, interact, communicate, and coordinate with 
all federal departments and agencies, across different domains, as well as with state and 
local governments. This coordination within planning communities, while needed among 
all levels of local, state, and national agencies, would also benefit the international 
community as well, both in terms of maximizing best practices and continuing to 
integrate pandemic planning efforts worldwide. 
C.  MEDIA AND ADVOCACY GROUPS REPORTS 
There is little question the media and advocacy groups play a significant role in 
surfacing issues of national importance, and especially  in the highly political arena of 
pandemic planning with its potential ramifications on public health. These entities 
frequently serve as government antagonists with the dual purpose of highlighting 
perceived and actual deficiencies as well as instigating sufficient public interest to result 
in government action to address the issues presented. Attacking the apparent confusion in 
the medical planning community in determining which department within the federal 
government is ultimately responsible for pandemic planning coordination, three 
comments from individuals serving in various capacities of public health capture the 
essence of the rising frustration surrounding pandemic planning. The pandemic 
coordinator for Los Angeles County states, “There were numerous conflicting guidance 
impulses at the federal level…that are neither explicit nor science-based” and “We cannot 
review guidance from different agencies and choose between them. That is not a 
scientific or rational process.”78 The professor and chair of the Department of Emergency 
Medicine, University of Rochester (New York) Medical Center notes “Sure, [the fed’s 
planning] looks great on paper, but the reality is something else .”79 The senior United  
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Nations system influenza coordinator warned “many national pandemic plans are not 
sufficiently operational, and the coordination of pandemic planning between countries 
needs even greater attention.”80   
Trust for America’s Health, a health advocacy nonprofit organization, found the 
influenza pandemic plans which were available to the public varied from comprehensive 
plans to stand-alone annexes to existing emergency plans,  and to concise summaries of 
individual states’ influenza pandemic plans. States and local jurisdictions participated 
minimally in the national planning for influenza pandemic81, with little doubt that the 
excessive plans were either too complex or too contradictory to fully embrace. 
The news media has been strongly divided on the state of pandemic planning at 
all jurisdictional levels, and even within aspects of medical preparedness and response. A 
common focus is oriented toward both medical facilities and influenza vaccine issues. 
Critics note hospitals are ill-prepared in bed space, trained staff, and medicinal stockpiles 
to adequately address a major pandemic.82 A recent study reported in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association found only 23 percent of the more than 400 nursing 
homes in the study had specific pandemic influenza plans, and 52 percent had no 
pandemic plan. The study was conducted among state health department or Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid-registered nursing homes.83 With substantial challenges such as 
untrained staff, drug inventories kept at “just in time” levels, and lack of overall hospital 
bed space in airborne infection isolation rooms required to care pandemic patients, a 
healthcare industry disaster preparedness expert believes individual healthcare facilities 
may have improved their overall readiness since the terrorist attacks of  September 11, 
2001.84  
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The National Governors Association for Best Practices conducted nine regional 
pandemic preparedness workshops to analyze state pandemic preparedness, including 
coordination activities among levels of government and the private sector. A key 
challenge identified during this effort was the absence of any baseline or agreed metric 
against which preparedness could be measured, and the fact that much of the initial 
motivation to expedite pandemic planning has diminished due to the limited spread of the 
H5N1 influenza to date.85   
As indicated earlier, the media has considerable influence over government 
actions regarding the national pandemic influenza planning, serving to inspire a closer 
look at preparedness at local, regional, and national levels.  Research from scientists in 
the probability of the influenza pandemic starting with contact from infected migratory 
birds, and published reports indicating no evidence of avian influenza despite testing of 
thousands of birds, may reduce the sense of urgency which initially garnered worldwide 
preparedness support86, while at the same time any media updates reporting new human 
cases of H5N1 spurs the call for better animal health surveillance and public heath 
surveillance, as well as the funding to enrich the communication and collaboration 
needed to monitor avian influenza worldwide.87 Substantial positive reporting also 
accompanies the announcement of potential successes in every area of pandemic 
preparedness, and especially with advancements in vaccines or the research driven by the 
pandemic influenza threat.88 This positive aspect is balanced by the negative reporting 
frequently associated with reports of governmental decisions such as reports of Tamiflu, 
an anti-flu drug, being reserved for specific categories of professionals or individuals 
based on the need for their expertise during a pandemic89, or the perception of an 
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arbitrary government decision on who is essential during an influenza pandemic.90 A 
recent report stirred instant and widespread public interest with revelations of a draft list, 
compiled by a task force of influential physicians from universities, medical groups, the 
military, and government agencies, with recommendations for prioritization of lifesaving 
care during a pandemic, in essence a determination of who doctors should let die.91   
Acknowledging the complexities in pandemic planning and preparedness remains 
a stalwart of the media and advocacy groups. Reporting on the plans, medical facilities, 
vaccine availability and complexity in administration of a vaccination program are but a 
few of the recurring subjects under the constant scrutiny of both government protagonists 
and pandemic planning advocates. This continued focus highlights the evolving and 
dynamic nature of pandemic planning as it continues to mature. 
D.  REPORTS AND RESEARCH PAPERS FROM THE MEDICAL AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH COMMUNITIES 
The final area of literature review incorporates the public health and medical 
communities outside the federal government who are primarily advocates for increased  
planning efforts and are extremely willing to highlight shortfalls in planning across all 
government sectors. This community of interest serves a watch dog function, and for the 
most part is altruistically motivated toward insuring the focus of pandemic planning and 
preparedness efforts serve to better protect the overall health of the general public. The 
American Public Health Association and American Medical Association are leading 
advocates in the promotion of pandemic influenza preparedness. 
The American Public Health Association (APHA) took an aggressive stance in 
publishing pandemic influenza guidance and in providing outreach opportunities to the 
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general public, including a blog, fact sheets, and two Get Ready Web sites at 
http://www.getreadyforflu.org and http://www.getreadyforflu.blogspot.com/.92   
Maintaining vigilance and an active voice for pandemic preparedness issues, 
APHA also recommends increased funding throughout the public health system to 
expand the capacity anticipated in response to pandemic influenza and increasing 
investment in the public health personnel sector in preparation and response to a 
pandemic incident.93  
APHA published a policy summary detailing subject areas requiring additional 
attention, as well as specific recommendations to address the issues. The subject areas 
addressed who will respond public health workforce issues, the role of 
nonpharmaceutical interventions, medical countermeasures, ensuring access to care, 
business and occupational health considerations, incorporating mental health into 
pandemic flu preparedness and response, and ensuring public health leadership.94 
Another influential organization in the medical and public health arenas is the 
American Medical Association (AMA), dedicated to the promotion of medicine and 
bettering public health. AMA helped raise the total number of health professionals 
trained to respond to disaster to more than 30,000, and was also influential in planning 
the Second National Congress on Health System Readiness, with a focus on pandemic 
influenza.95 Specific fields of medicine have also determined their collective importance 
to the challenges inherent during an influenza pandemic, and radiology professionals, 
with their chest radiography and computed tomography capabilities, will play a pivotal 
role in the diagnosis of a pandemic influenza. These professionals will ultimately be put 
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under ethical challenges to provide care even though repeated radiological exposure 
could put themselves and their families at risk. Significant numbers of medical providers 
will also face this ethical dilemma during the pandemic influenza response and recovery 
phases.96   
Perhaps one of the most prolific sources of information reporting on pandemic 
planning is the University of Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and 
Policy, more commonly known as CIDRAP.  Reporting on the online resource and 
community forum FluWIKI, CIDRAP praised the level of detail shared by the science 
advisor to HHS, Doctor William Raub, and highlighted an emerging theme that federal 
officials strongly endorse the need for a shared responsibility in pandemic planning.  
Raub wrote that citizens can expect the federal government to engage in pandemic 
planning with a prominent role, but “To the extent that potential partners refuse to apply 
their talents and assets unless the federal government foots the bill, they are abdicating 
their responsibility and thereby placing their communities at higher risk than need be.”97  
CIDRAP also tracks pandemic planning around the globe, reporting on 
international conferences, further preparedness publications from WHO, and updates on 
medical treatment and advances in disease control, surveillance, and pharmaceutical 
initiatives.98 Capturing the sentiment from national and international health leaders at a 
meeting in Malaysia, CIDRAP noted attendees warned of complacency due to the belief 
nothing can be done to avert a pandemic or that a solution is imminent, even among high 
levels of government.99  
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A task force of Canadian and American medical experts scrutinized disaster 
preparation, surge capacity, and rationing across the spectrum of natural disasters, 
pandemics, and terrorist attacks, and emphasized a shortfall many planners have 
overlooked: the probability that an influenza pandemic or terrorist attack will not only 
increase demand for critical medical supplies, but will also severely cripple supply 
lines.100  With reports that the U.S. has enough prepandemic influenza vaccine to 
inoculate 13 million people, and HHS reporting an investment of more than 130 million 
dollars toward additional vaccine research,101 communities are anxious to see substantial 
progress in vaccine availability to alleviate the known shortfall. A Congressional Budget 
Office report recommended a shift in funding to support development of adjuvants and 
next-generation vaccines,102 even as many states report robust stockpiles of antiviral 
drugs.103 
The repercussion of not including local communities and neighborhood 
organizations to refine pandemic plans could include a loss of public support. Most 
pandemic plans fail to tap into a community’s self-knowledge, and the lack of effort to 
connect this linkage fails to recognize how influential community activists and grassroots 
organizations can be in the planning process.104  
With the majority of information focused on domestic issues, CIDRAP maintains 
vigilance over a wide assortment of evolving issues, such as the tiered approach in a  
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vaccination plan recommended by federal health officials, as well as the blowback from 
CIDRAP’s own director due to the lack of consideration to specifically address key 
infrastructure and economic issues.105  
With few large-scale pandemic influenza response exercises to use as a sample 
base, CDC nonetheless published recommendations from a March 2008 exercise, 
identifying potential benefits from the incorporation of subject-matter experts and 
planning experts in a planning-cell approach to more carefully assess dynamic situations 
as a pandemic event unfolds. CDC’s report also recognized that an influenza pandemic 
will likely unfold at varying rates and in different ways in different regions of the 
country.106 
During the 2007 CDC Summit on business preparedness, CIDRAP notes Julie 
Gerberding, MD, director of CDC, emphasized that CDC lists 1,600 tasks under the 
heading of pandemic preparedness, and that preparedness requires careful planning, with 
recommendations for exercises to test the validity of the plans.107 Capturing comments 
on funding to help state and local public agencies build a mechanism to respond during 
pandemic influenza and other health emergencies, CIDRAP discloses CDC’s Public 
Health Emergency Program (PHEP), a cooperative grant program, has distributed $4.9 
billion in funds from fiscal years 2002 through 2007.108  CIDRAP captures and reports 
on pandemic planning developments within individual states as well as regionally. 
CIDRAP notes that Indiana county-level planners encountered problems across the 
spectrum — from misunderstandings of the threat to a lack of coordination, and even 
rivalry between hospitals — and “some planners thought a pandemic would involve such 
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high rates of illness and death that planning would be useless, and many officials had 
unrealistic expectations about getting help from outside sources such as the National 
Guard or the state governor.”109  Quick to propagate practices with the potential for 
successful application across the United States, CIDRAP publishes “Promising Practices 
For Pandemic Planning,” with recent reports revealing North Carolina’s development of 
disaster preparedness kiosks, touch-screen computers available to assist county and city 
public health departments in outreach programs to provide interactive presentations on 
various health related topics, to include pandemic preparedness.110 Another success 
highlighted was the launch of an online toolkit to streamline the needs assessments of 
vulnerable populations in Kansas, and noted the kit includes Spanish translations to assist 
in assessments.111  
CIDRAP’s “Promising Practices: Pandemic Preparedness Tools” is an online 
database showcasing peer-reviewed practices to assist other practitioners with their 
planning. Twelve state initiatives in establishing formal collaborations between public 
health and healthcare systems were published in early 2008, and the practices revealed a 
concerted effort to strengthen the collaborative process among these agencies.112 Other 
initiatives among the states include a “Parents’ Guide to Pandemic Flu” developed in 
Michigan113 and Alabama’s “Flu and You” Pandemic Flu educational poster, which 
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promotes hygiene and social distancing.114 CIDRAP also reports on pandemic planning 
developments within other agencies, including the Department of Defense. Given the 
ominous task to address the mortuary and medical necessities inherent to a national 
pandemic event, Joint Task Force Civil Support recommends the development of a 
separate Emergency Support Function within DHS to deal exclusively with mass 
fatalities, and includes the creation of memoranda of understanding among medical 
professionals with similar skill sets such as pathologists, anthropologists, and dentists, 
among others.115 
In summary, reports and research papers from the medical and public health 
communities serve to keep numerous medical practitioners, planners, politicians, and 
international public health organizations apprised of continuing developments in 
pandemic planning efforts. These organizations and individuals highlight positive 
developments, such as medicinal advances and best practices in preparedness initiatives, 
as well as international developments impacting the public health community at large. 
Their perspective and openness in reporting negatives, such as shortages in medical 
practitioners and bed spaces, funding for more research, and consequences of inadequate 
coordination also provides value across pandemic planning communities.   
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In order to adequately assess planning within the United States, it is useful to step 
back and evaluate whether this nation falls short, parallels, or leads other nations in 
pandemic planning. The literature review indicates the U.S. leads in virtually all aspects, 
and is one of the leaders in both financing and facilitating international pandemic 
planning efforts, primarily though the auspices of the World Health Organization and the 
Department of Health and Human Service’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC). 
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This literature review provides a solid foundation upon which to further explore 
the adequacies in pandemic planning across the United States.  It is already suspected, 
based on this cursory review, that further analysis of pandemic plans developed on 
common guidance may reveal disparities in consistency, with potentially devastating 
results if not effectively remedied.    
Beyond early multiagency confusion over which government agency was 
responsible for pandemic planning, there are clear indications that a coordinated federal, 
state, and local planning initiative failed to materialize. This was evidenced by the 
plethora of federal, media, advocacy group, and medical and public health publications 
and reports attesting to the lack of clear guidance from the federal government. 
Determining the amount and specificity of government guidance and direction, while a 
time-consuming initiative, may pay dividends in the revelation of how much or how little 
guidance is available to other pandemic planners. 
Following this line of investigation, the following chapters of this thesis will 
analyze state and federal pandemic plans to determine adequacy and consistency among 
these plans.  
Upon completion of the analysis, observations and recommendations will be 
submitted. It is already apparent, based on both the preliminary and comprehensive 
literature review, that the U.S. has significant room for improving the pandemic planning 
process.  Two questions remain: What level of effort and course of action will be 
required, and do we have time to execute this option before the next pandemic occurs? 
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III. ANALYTICAL MATRIX 
A. MATRIX DEVELOPMENT 
Developing an analytical tool to ensure consistency when comparing the state 
pandemic plans and the primary federal pandemic plan involved a somewhat complex 
process.  The analytical tool evolved under the guidance of four professional plans 
analysts and twelve Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from critical fields deeply entrenched 
in the response and recovery aspects of the pandemic planning process. The Emergency 
Plans Analysis Team (EPAT) is comprised of four members with master’s degrees in 
various disciplines, and none of the four members has prior military service. EPAT 
routinely examines federal, state, and local jurisdiction crisis action plans for gap analysis 
purposes. The SMEs are all either military officers from all branches of service or 
military retirees.  The average experience in their respective fields of expertise among the 
SMEs is approximately seventeen years, and these members were selected based on both 
their functional area and their years of experience.  All participants routinely perform 
plans analysis within their respective functional areas, similar to the effort for this 
pandemic plans analysis.  
The fields of expertise represented by the SMEs were communications, mortuary 
affairs, medical, command and control, transportation, public affairs, and logistics. 
Questions developed for the matrix reflect considerations for anticipated shortfalls in 
capabilities within these functional areas, with the presumption these shortfalls would 
constitute the bases for assistance requests from federal agencies should the state need 
help. The following are examples of questions from each functional area included within 
the matrix: 
(Communications) Does the plan address mobile contingency 
communications vehicles, systems and/or communications interoperability 
among the state and local first responders? 
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(Mortuary Affairs) Does the plan address the issue of initial supply and re-
supply of Mortuary Affairs materials and equipment, to include 
refrigerated vans, human remains pouches, etc.?  
(Medical) Does the plan address how medical officials will coordinate in a 
multi-jurisdictional environment, with local health departments and state 
and federal officials? 
(Command and Control) Does the plan address how the state will 
coordinate with local and federal officials, as well as the private sector, to 
maintain critical infrastructure services as well as transportation, utilities, 
and food supply, especially in the event of significant and sustained 
absenteeism? 
(Transportation) Does the state anticipate need for supplementation of 
local government transportation systems with personnel and logistical 
support in order to transport essential goods and emergency services 
personnel where necessary? 
(Public Affairs) Does the plan address how medical officials/healthcare 
personnel will coordinate with public affairs/communications officials for 
information dispersal to the public, including public education and risk 
communication measures? 
(Logistics) Does the plan identify facilities that can be used for temporary 
housing operations for quarantine and/or non-traditional treatment centers, 
identify who has responsibility for overseeing quarantine and/or treatment 
locations, and how care and feeding of quarantined citizens can be 
performed? 
The resultant tool was a matrix comprised of fifty questions from these functional 
fields. The basic purpose was to objectively assess whether plans include information 
critical to determining the amount of potential support needed from federal agencies that 
may respond to the state requesting federal support. The second purpose was to assign 
one of three degrees to a state’s compliance with the functional question presented:  
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 Fully Addressed, indicating the components were in place to meet the 
requirements within the subject matter question 
 Partially Addressed, indicating planning components were in place and could 
meet some, but not all, of the requirements based on the question, yet lacked the 
requirements for consideration of the Fully Addressed rating  
 Not Addressed, indicating formal plan components were not in place at the time 
this review was undertaken or subject matter was not addressed within the state 
plans 
It is noteworthy to consider that the questions used to develop an analytical matrix 
will produce a more specific focus on varying aspects of the pandemic plans.  Depending 
on the intentions for analysis, a similar matrix may be developed to look exclusively at 
public health concerns, the differing aspects within an internal program (such as the 
security, prioritization, and distribution of vaccines), or the legal ramifications resulting 
from mandated quarantine initiatives.  Once an area for review is determined and the 
analytical tool developed, the process is rather straightforward.   
The analytical matrix was developed before the state pandemic plans were 
accessed, thus the questions were not tailored against known deficiencies. Instead, they 
developed logically, without prior knowledge of what the state plans specifically 
addressed. The resulting documentation provides a gap analysis between local and state 
capabilities and potential mission assignments for the federal response force. The analysis 
is based solely on the information provided in the plans, and does not identify nor 
measure specific capabilities. The states were not provided the same criteria used to 
assess their plans, as their plans were already published prior to executing this analysis.   
B. ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Each functional area was evaluated by two members, and members were given 
the latitude to discuss their individual observations between themselves during the rating 
process.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed as outstanding by the team leadership due to 
the established working relationships among the participants, as all members are assigned 
to the same organization outside this analysis effort.  At any time during the process, 
members could consult with other functional experts within or outside the evaluation 
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team.  It is noteworthy that, due in large part to the seniority of the participants and the 
resident expertise among the team, no requests for supplemental support were presented. 
A post-analysis briefing was presented to the EPAT and SMEs with the opportunity to 
challenge any of the observations and submissions, and only one area required further 
explanation, due to the complex nature of the subject matter.    
The analysis was executed using Emergency Support Function (ESF) linkage 
through functional groupings, as depicted in The National Response Plan, as the National 
Response Framework had not been released prior to the publication of the state plans and 
HHS’ plan.  The actual analysis of all fifty state plans occurred over a span of more than 
four months.  The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan analysis took less than a week to 
execute, as it lacks the complexity and variances inherent among the state plans.  
The summary of this process provides analysis of state pandemic influenza plans 
and comparison to the federal plan to support both deliberate planning and contingency 
planning.  The end product reveals commonalities in planning deficiencies among federal 
and state plans.  
Per agreement with legal experts, the matrix and the results for individual states 
are not releasable outside Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) without written 
permission from the Commander, JTF-CS, and are therefore classified.  For the purposes 
of this thesis, the planning trends, deficiencies, laudable findings, and other observations 
were not specifically attributable to any single state, thus maintaining the integrity of the 
legal restrictions and allowing the results to be unclassified.  
The final matrix design and the analysis process combined for an effort that 
exceeded five months in duration.  Capturing professional plans analysts and subject 
matter experts to contribute to both aspects of this project was invaluable in developing 
the matrix tool, executing the analysis process, and validating the final analysis. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL PANDEMIC PLANS 
Our Nation will face this global threat united in purpose and united in 
action in order to best protect our families, our communities, our Nation, 
and our world from the threat of pandemic influenza. 
                                                                       —President George W. Bush   
                                                                                May 2006 
 
Pandemics, while rare, are not new. In the 20th Century, three flu 
pandemics were responsible for more than 50 million deaths worldwide, 
and almost a million deaths in the United States. 
                                                                       —The Pandemic Leadership Forum,  
                                                                                  June 13, 2007  
 
 
A. STATE PLANS ANALYSIS 
It is important to note that while many states have pandemic influenza plans as 
stand-alone guides, others do not differentiate between pandemic influenza and other 
disaster scenarios.  The states primarily intend pandemic influenza plans to augment 
existing state emergency operations plans and do not supersede biological or mass 
casualty annexes.  
Thirty-nine states published pandemic influenza plans as stand-alone products, 
while eleven states have pandemic plans as an annex or appendix to more comprehensive 
disaster plans.  Only three states specifically included additional plans with their overall 
pandemic influenza plan.  Although originally required to have a state pandemic plan 
available to the general public by November 2007, several states missed that deadline.  
Specific reasons for this failure were not provided, but apparently, the tardiness incurred 
no repercussions.  The majority of state plans were published in 2006 and 2007, with 




The completed analysis revealed a substantial disparity on specificity among the 
states for planning to address:  
 estimating the number of fatalities and assets needed to adequately 
manage the resultant strain on resources;  
 anticipating the issues surrounding vaccine distribution, inventories, and 
licensing; response personnel recall and force augmentation processes;  
 detailed procedures indicating points of contact for response agencies; 
 implementation details for quarantine and isolation measures;  
 procedures, security, and locations for distribution of emergency supplies; 
and 
 specific procedures for coordination between agencies responsible for 
keeping the public informed,  
This list highlights a few of the more common issues. The following graphs 
illustrate the disparities by functional areas, and the chapter conclusion will summarize 
















































Figure 3.   About one-fourth of the communications systems questions were thoroughly 




Figure 4.   The federal plan failed to address more than two-thirds of the communication 
system questions. 

















Figure 5.   States overwhelmingly failed to address questions of logistics. 
 
 
Figure 6.   None of the logistics questions were ignored in the federal plan. 

















Figure 7.   State plans addressed the majority of medical questions.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Federal plans addressed all of the medical questions. 






















Figure 10.   The federal plan addressed about half of the mortuary affairs questions. 

















Figure 11.   Public affairs questions were mostly ignored in the state plans. 
 
 
Figure 12.   None of the public affairs questions were ignored in the federal plan. 

















Figure 13.   Transportation questions were mostly ignored in the state plan. 
 
 
Figure 14.   One-third of Transportation questions were not addressed in the federal plan. 

















Figure 15.   Overall, the state plans failed to address pandemic planning issues. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Overall, most pandemic planning issues were at least partially addressed in the 
federal plan. 















As depicted graphically, the questions referencing transportation received the 
least attention collectively among all the states, with no single question being fully 
addressed and only seven states partially addressing the questions. As critical as 
movement of goods and people will be during a pandemic event, both within a state’s 
boundaries as well as transitioning into another state, it is discouraging to find this 
particular functional area received so little attention.  
Only one other functional field of questions received a zero fully compliant 
rating; logistics filled that dubious honor.  Only eleven states partially addressed the 
issues, while the vast majority of states were non-compliant.  With the inquiry focused on 
facilities for emergency staging, warehousing, and distribution of medications and 
temporary housing for treatment centers and quarantine, the perplexing issue was the 
total failure of all fifty states to address policies and procedures for sanitation of 
quarantined areas.  
Third in line to the bottom rung for collective inattention was the mortuary affairs 
functional area. This is particularly discouraging as the magnitude of deaths resulting 
from an influenza pandemic will wreak havoc within every jurisdiction where the disease 
is prevalent.  Only two states fully addressed the specific questions, and the majority of 
states were clearly non-compliant, with one state failing to address a single aspect of the 
eleven questions comprising the mortuary affairs battery of questions.  
The functional area of command and control also received marginal attention as 
indicted by this analysis, with four of ten questions receiving zero fully compliant 
findings. The core questions with the zero compliance ratings dealt with coordination and 
specific roles for state and federal agencies, processes for requesting federal assistance, 
and integration of the private sector to maintain critical infrastructure supplies and 
functions.  
Communications issues were somewhat balanced between full compliance and 
partial compliance, yet the results show a majority of states registered non-compliance on 
such issues as expansion of trunks and nets, coordination among all jurisdictions of 
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responders, and actual contingency communications vehicles, systems, and 
interoperability within the local first responder community. 
In the public affairs, intelligence, and information-sharing category, the results 
indicate most states understand the necessities in reaching out to the impacted 
communities to ensure an honest, consistent message is broadcast in respect to 
recommended courses of actions, spread of the disease, and actions underway by local, 
state and federal responders in mitigating the impacts of the pandemic. A notable 
shortfall within this category was the lack of planning in listing the television and radio 
stations in the area, and points of contact for these venues, which will be critical in 
getting any messages to the public at large during the advancement and aftermath of the 
pandemic event. Only one state fully complied with this aspect, and forty-nine states 
received a non-compliant finding. 
The sole area where it appears the majority of states focused their pandemic 
planning efforts was in the medical functional area.  While far from sterling results were 
found, this area showed the state plans acknowledged the enormity of the pandemic threat 
by treating this area with apparently more deliberate contingency planning.  With sixteen 
total questions comprising the medical battery, the attention to detail among many of the 
states was evident. This single area of focus, while leaving substantial margin for 
improvement, captures the essence of what many planners perceive as the greatest 
obstacle: developing comprehensive medical response plans to effectively minimize the 
catastrophic loss of life, mitigate the impact to local and national economies, and 
minimize the sustained suffering of the public through the multi-wave attack of the next 
pandemic.  
The overall analysis of the state plans shows considerable room for improvement 
in multiple functional areas.  When reviewing the analysis of the combined state plans, 
the weakest areas are mortuary affairs, transportation, logistics and public affairs.  Only 
two questions in the entire matrix had fifty Not Addressed ratings:  
 
 Does the plan address a preventative medicine plan for Mortuary Affairs staff and 
support personnel (immunizations, antidotes, and prophylaxis)? 
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 Does the plan address policies and procedures for sanitation of 
quarantined/isolated areas? 
 
As state planners were provided the initial federal pandemic influenza plan as the 
basis for development of their own internal plans, how is it the state plans appear to have 
missed the mark?  Is there a problem in planning methodology, were the wrong personnel 
on the planning committees, or was the document that serves as the template for the state 
plans inadequate? 
B. FEDERAL PLAN ANALYSIS 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the federal 
department selected to formulate a national plan for preparing and responding to a 
pandemic influenza event within the United States.  HHS published its comprehensive 
document in November 2005 on their government web site for pandemic flu.  HHS notes 
that the plan is “a blueprint for pandemic influenza preparation and response.  It provides 
guidance to national, state, and local policy makers and health departments.”116  
For the purposes of this thesis, the first two parts of the plan — outlining federal 
plans and preparation for public health and medical support, and providing detailed 
guidance to state and local health departments — are analyzed for adequacy of 
preparedness and planning guidance. The analysis of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
(HHS Plan) on its own merit was undertaken to determine if the plan provided the salient 
guidance to meet the needs for which it was published, and to determine specific 
shortfalls, if any, that would impact the communities for which the plan was produced.  
The most specific details HHS provides for planning purposes are found in both the ten 
appendices in Part 1, HHS Strategic Plan, and the eleven supplements, including various 
checklists, contained in Part 2, Public Health Guidance for State and Local Partners.  
It is appropriate to note that the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was 
released almost simultaneously with the HHS Plan, and may have influenced the 
                                                 
116 “HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services publication.  
November 2005. 
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development of some state plans.  The Homeland Security Council’s approach provided 
an outline of how the nation would prepare, detect, and react to a pandemic, and defined 
roles for federal, state, and local agencies, as well as private industry and individual 
citizens.  The verbiage outlining specific roles and responsibilities was extremely vague, 
which may have had a direct consequence as states developed their pandemic influenza 
plans. 
For the purpose of this paper, the same grading criteria was used for the federal 
plan as was used for the state plans, with the expectation that the overall results would 
reveal differences and similarities commensurate with the results from the state plans 
analysis.  A minor obstacle arose in using the same analytical matrix applied to the state 
plans for the HHS Plan evaluation.  The matrix was designed to address specific items 
within state plans, which are not addressed at all in the federal plan. This issue is 
annotated within each specific functional area to the degree it affects the overall ratings, 
but it does not affect the outcome of the analysis for the purpose of this paper. 
The first area analyzed was Communications.  While the HHS Plan fully 
addressed coordination among local, state, federal, DoD, and interagency partners, it 
completely failed to address the remaining two communications questions.  This shortfall 
is directly attributable to the development of the analytical matrix as mentioned above, 
specifically that the capabilities would not be addressed from a federal perspective, but 
rather are unique issues that fall under the purview of state and local jurisdictions. 
Supplement 10, Public Health Communications, provides the most comprehensive 
guidance for interagency and multi-jurisdictional coordination. 
Mortuary Affairs guidance, as provided under Supplement 3, Healthcare 
Planning, was partially addressed in four of the ten questions, only fully addressed in one 
question, and five questions were rated as not addressed.  References to other federal 
guides and publications regarding mortuary affairs issues may have positively improved 
the ratings in the non-compliant questions, but the intent of analyzing the primary HHS 
Plan was to review it as a stand-alone guide, thus additional reference material was not 
included in the overall analysis. 
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Not a single question within the Medical section of the matrix failed to be either 
fully or partially addressed, and this area received a majority of the focus throughout the 
HHS Plan. The span of the medical questions required researching six of the eleven 
supplements, including Supplement 1, Pandemic Influenza Surveillance; Supplement 2, 
Laboratory Diagnostics; Supplement 3, Healthcare Planning; Supplement 6, Vaccine 
Distribution and Use; Supplement 7, Antiviral Drug Distribution and Use; and 
Supplement 11, Workforce Support: Psychosocial Considerations and Information Needs. 
Only one other area within this analysis scored as well as this section, and no area 
exceeded this overall evaluation, with seven questions being fully addressed.    
Within the Command and Control area, two of ten questions received fully 
addressed ratings, while three questions were partially addressed, and four areas were not 
addressed due to the questions being targeted to the individual states plans. Remarkably, 
one question was not addressed which would significantly influence many state plans, 
and the failure to address measures to educate, prepare and care for citizens with 
disabilities and/or special needs populations is an oversight with substantial 
repercussions, both in depth and breadth of impacted populations.  Supplement 9, 
Managing Travel-Related Risk of Disease Transmission, provided the basis for this 
section of analysis. 
Transportation was also covered within Supplement 9, Managing Travel-Related 
Risk of Disease Transmission, with two of the three questions being partially addressed. 
The remaining question was, again, state-specific and involved augmentation of local 
transportation systems to transport essential goods and emergency services.  
The single area outside Medical where considerable effort was expended to 
address a critical aspect of pandemic influenza planning was Public Affairs.  With two of 
four questions being fully addressed, and the remaining two being partially addressed, it 
is evident the federal government places a premium on orchestrating a well-coordinated, 
consistent, and timely information campaign during all phases of a pandemic influenza 
event. The comprehensive guidance for this field was found in Supplement 10, Public 
Health Communications, and is applicable from tactical to strategic planning. 
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The final area for evaluation was Logistics, which also received solid ratings. 
Two of three questions were partially addressed, and the remaining question was fully 
addressed.  Due to the nature of the specific questions, two supplements provided the 
requisite guidance: Supplement 4, Infection Control; and Supplement 8, Community 
Disease Control and Prevention. 
As the analysis matrix revealed, the overall HHS Plan had several minor gaps in 
specific guidance to other planning communities, but generally provided sound general 
guidance.  The functional areas of Communications, Logistics, and Transportation were 
generally solid, with room for interpretation and adjustment to fit the individual needs of 
the non-federal planners.  The two strongest areas, Medical and Public Affairs, support 
the conviction and purpose in this planning effort, that is, the medical aspects require 
significant focus, as does the collective public information campaign.  While Command 
and Control was adequate in this analysis, the issue regarding the need to educate, 
prepare, and care for citizens with disabilities and special needs populations would be 
value-added in future guidance, if only as a reminder to the planning community that the 
whole population is at risk during a pandemic. The single area most in need of additional 
concentrated focus is the Mortuary Affairs functional area.  In planning for an imminent 
national disaster, state and local planners and responders should not be burdened with the 
need to access and interpret additional guides and publications, especially when 
considering these plans are meant to anticipate, as well as mitigate, the wide-scale 
mortality expected during a pandemic influenza event.  
Although plans are meant to be anticipatory by their very nature, many challenges 
were cast toward HHS in taking the lead for our nation.  Among those challenges was the 
necessity to publish guidance quickly, despite changes in public perception of the validity 
and enormity of the pandemic influenza threat. Additionally, the plan needed to target a 
broad audience and include areas of consideration such as legal, medical, logistics, 
transportation, and vaccination protocols, among others.  Another factor challenging the 
development and publication of a single federal plan is the reality that most plans are 
living documents, subject to refinements as time, operating environment, and situation 
dictates.  When consideration is given to the magnitude of impact upon the population, 
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infrastructure, medical communities, economy, emergency responders, and consumer 
goods and services, the HHS Plan, in its initial “blueprint” version, provides a solid tool 
in assisting others to create, modify, exercise, adjust, and solidify their individual plans.  
Driven by executive-level tasking and fully comprehending the challenge, HHS 
produced a solid primary reference guide, neither perfect nor final, and provided the 
broader planning community a tool to assist in adapting a proactive approach to 
pandemic planning and preparedness.    
C. COMBINED PLANS AND COMMON DEFICIENCIES 
HHS has the primary responsibility for actions required to protect the health of all 
Americans and provide essential human services, and is the lead agency to provide 
recommendations to ensure continuity of services to federal, state, local, and tribal 
agencies, private sector businesses, and other communities of interest.  The current 
planning guidance, while getting better over time, still lacks the specificity to encourage a 
collaborative environment.  This is due in large part to the federal government’s inability 
to mandate compliance over lower level jurisdictions.  
Capturing the planning deficiencies common to both the states’ pandemic 
influenza plans and the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (HHS Plan) reveals significant 
areas where planning efforts require more attention from executive-level planners and 
preparedness managers.  Common deficiencies applicable to both plans in general include  
 
 failure to adequately identify specific roles and responsibilities of government 
agencies at all levels 
 failure to provide in-depth planning for all aspects of mortuary affairs, 
troublesome due to the modeling projection of close to two million fatalities in the 
United States alone 
 failure to address strategic message outreach through local or national media 
outlets 
 failure to emphasize the importance of sanitation and general hygiene for 
quarantined areas and areas controlled for mandated population isolation 
 failure to develop substantial Mutual Aid Agreements among all agencies and 
across all jurisdictions 
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 failure to identify processes and procedures to restrict, discourage, or encourage 
the movement of personnel, goods, and vessels across state borders as deemed 
necessary by governing officials to mitigate pandemic impact  
 
The importance of this list is to highlight how inconsistencies in planning, 
arguably in planning processes, planning team composition, and attention to details, may 
result in inadequate and inconsistent pandemic plans.  Addressing these concerns is 
neither difficult nor problematic. In order to prevail over these issues, planning process 
owners and leaders need to determine what goals are being sought and how to mold the 
planning process to achieve these goals.  Additionally, adequate representation of 
functional area experts will facilitate thorough planning across the spectrum of issues, 
ensuring proper focus and depth is given to each facet of the plan.  It is conceivable that 
these aspects of an effective planning process received little or no attention during the 
development of both the HHS Plan and the majority of state plans, yet the suggested 
remedy is straight-forward.  While these common planning deficiencies showcase 
problems within both echelons of government as analyzed, other crucial planning areas 
are also worth mentioning. 
During any incident of national significance, including a pandemic influenza, the 
potential for disruption of critical services and real, or perceived, interruptions in 
government availability and administration may result in complete loss of confidence in 
government, with the potential to erupt into massive civil disturbances.  A critical area in 
both the federal and states plans, which was not evaluated fully by the plans analysts for 
this thesis, is the continuity of operations plan (COOP), which details providing goods, 
services, and critical infrastructure support.  Additionally, the continuity of the 
government (COG) plan, which formalizes processes to ensure the continuation of civil 
obedience and perpetuates the validity of security in maintaining law and order, was 
missing in the majority of all plans reviewed.  Consensus among the group of evaluators 
conducting the analysis for this paper indicated the lack of planning for COOP or COG 
was a major omission, and one with particularly dire consequences should public disorder 
elevate from concern to panic, and ultimately to civil disturbance on a grand scale.  
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The analysis of the HHS Plan, using the single matrix for this thesis, revealed 
minor deficiencies in planning and preparedness guidance.  It is significant to note HHS 
has published multiple updates to the basic plan and, in furthering their commitment and 
responsibility toward nationwide pandemic influenza planning, has also carefully 
developed guides targeted to both specific audiences and topics.  Concurrently published 
in November 2005 with the HHS Plan was the Homeland Security Council’s National 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, which revealed the federal government’s strategic plan 
for confronting this national threat.  While not intended to supplement nor augment the 
HHS Plan, it successfully laid out the groundwork for rationalizing the federal approach.  
It is also worthwhile to note the majority of the states’ plans were developed and 
published in 2006 and 2007, during which time HHS, through the CDC as well as other 
mechanisms, published numerous guides for local, state, and tribal agencies, and across 
other domains including private industry and other federal agencies.  A feasible factor 
contributing to the deficiencies noted within the state plans is the timing of these 
subsequent federal guidelines.  The majority of the states have yet to incorporate the 
recent recommendations.  As planning is a resource-intensive effort, states may delay 
adjusting their plans pending further major changes in the federal approach, or may have 
dedicated a specific timeframe to making adjustments, perhaps in a scheduled periodic 
review. 
As indicated previously, the intent of the federal government in the publication of 
the HHS Plan was to provide a broad blueprint to be utilized across all jurisdictions, 
especially states, in their development of pandemic influenza planning.  Given the 
deficiencies evident in the federal plan, it is not surprising that many states reflect the 
same planning omissions as the HHS Plan. While no repercussions were suggested for 
failure to produce plans identical to the federal plan, there were also no rewards for 
producing more robust plans.  Several states produced comprehensive pandemic plans in 
individual functional areas within their overall plan, taking the federal blueprint and 
expanding details significantly, according to their own needs and goals. This is 
significant in consideration of the potential positives results stemming from information 
sharing across the pandemic planning community.  Whether through attention to details, 
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careful selection in assembling the planning committee membership, or instituting an 
effective and thorough planning process, the resultant state planning efforts validated that 
the HHS Plan could be used as a guiding tool and not just a mandatory, cut-and-paste 
template. 
With continuous refinement in subsequent federal guides, the overall national 
planning and preparedness posture has the potential for significant improvement. 
Providing more fidelity in the federal planning guidance, with the intent of sharing these 
refinements among the state, local and tribal agencies, as well as among all interested 
parties, would provide a consistent blueprint for enhanced pandemic planning efforts.  
Would taxpayers expect anything less? 
D. ONGOING RESEARCH WARRANTED 
Additional and more rigorous research is clearly warranted to realize the full 
impact of the diverse claims regarding the adequacy of national-level planning efforts in 
preparation for a pandemic event impacting the United States. A systematic review of all 
current federal pandemic planning documents and guides, as well as all recent revisions 
to state pandemic plans, will reveal whether planning has stagnated or if it continues to 
evolve.  Furthermore, an analysis of the composition of the individual pandemic planning 
committees within each jurisdiction may provide valuable insight into how this 
composition impacted specific functional areas within the overall plans.  Finally, more 
insight may be gained by determining the review cycle for state and federal plans to 
ascertain whether the pandemic plans will remain dynamic products. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.  
—Philosopher George Santayana  
 
I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander 
for the D-Day Invasion of France and later 34th 
President of the United States 
 
 
My interpretation of the analysis for the states’ plans and the HHS Pandemic 
Influenza Plan supports the initial premise that the collective federal and state pandemic 
plans are inadequate.  While there is a dire need for improvement in multiple facets, the 
need for a collaborative approach, reaching across all communities of interest, rises to the 
highest priority. 
As history has shown, pandemic events occur in random fashion.  Determining 
the scope and scale for a potential pandemic influenza event is beyond the capabilities of 
modern medicine and public health practitioners. Much can be estimated, based on 
modeling initiatives and a thorough understanding of all the factors that add to the 
complexity of determining the adequacy of planning, response, and recovery efforts 
designed to mitigate the anticipated worldwide devastation the next pandemic will 
deliver.   
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention, in the worst case scenario, approximately 
156,500,000 Americans could be afflicted with the Avian Influenza virus, with 
predictions of 90 million ill, 45 million in outpatient care, almost 10 million hospitalized, 
1.5 million in intensive care, and 742,500 on ventilation.  The total estimated deaths for 
this scenario are approximately 2 million in the United States alone.  With this level of 
impact in a highly industrialized nation, it is easy to imagine the loss of life and massive 
medical response necessary in developing countries, as the worldwide impact of a 
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pandemic will significantly challenge the global community at large.  While this 
particular scenario appears precise, other pandemics may involve varying degrees of 
severity. Factors such as ease of transmission, total affected regions and populations, and 
regional readiness efforts, including the immediate initiation of a vaccination strategy, 
bear considerable weight for minimizing the potential devastation.  
An optimistic estimate forecasts that an effective vaccine may not be available for 
up to six months after the initial pandemic outbreak, yet many in the medical community 
believe eighteen months is more realistic.  With so much at stake for tens of millions of 
people in the international community, as well as tens of millions within the United 
States, it is imperative that every effort is made to elevate the pandemic response from its 
current back-burner status and manage it as a national planning priority.  Ultimately, the 
measures of effectiveness regarding the adequacy of pandemic planning may never be 
realized until the next pandemic occurs.  
The basis of reaching an effective plan is to identify and articulate the desired 
outcome of the planning effort, in this case, a comprehensive pandemic plan, but with the 
recognition that planning must be viewed as a dynamic process, subject to continuous 
revision and refinement based on experience, shared information, advances in 
technology, and multiple environmental factors. Pandemic planning is particularly 
complex due to many of the following factors: 
 
 the unpredictability of when a pandemic will occur and where it will 
strike; 
 the severity of the impact, both in terms of mortality and geographical 
boundaries;  
 the limited pharmaceutical interventions currently available and the 
willingness of the affected population to adhere to public health advice; 
and 
 the dynamics of collaboration among planning communities.  
Due to the scope and magnitude of the pandemic threat and these combined 
complexities, pandemic planning must be an iterative process to maintain relevance and 
effectiveness.  As the principal stakeholders in pandemic planning and readiness, 
 63
communities of interest including public health, medical, and critical infrastructure will 
need to continue confronting, analyzing, validating, consolidating, and sharing best 
practices and lessons learned as more effective strategies and planning practices evolve.  
Although pandemic planning is commonly viewed as an exclusively public health 
responsibility, consideration for potential wide-scale impacts on the economy and critical 
infrastructure must also be considered. Attention must be given to continuity of 
operations and continuity of government issues as well.  
Another consideration in the planning process is strategic communications, vital 
for conveying plans, actions, and mitigation strategies to be shared with the public.  The 
strategic message must instill public confidence through honest and message-consistent 
outreach. Is there a simple option worthy of consideration in sharing pandemic plans?  
An option for facilitating public outreach and education on pandemic readiness would 
provide pandemic planning information to the lowest denominator, the individual and 
family members. Notwithstanding excellent public information outreach initiatives within 
many states, such as Washington State’s Pandemic Influenza guide,117 a concerted effort 
to publish personal pandemic influenza information and preparedness guides would 
mitigate much of the public’s frustration over the uncertainty of what to expect during a 
pandemic event.  To keep costs to a minimum, a single-page information bulletin could 
be enclosed with every state and federal income tax return, providing, at a minimum,  
web site information and public health agency contact information.  
Recognition that the planning process must engage multiple cross-domain 
partners, facilitating this initiative will require considerable interagency skills in team-
building and process development.  Multiple stakeholders and partners must unite in 
purpose to capitalize on the capabilities, experience, and expertise within the community 
of interest to improve pandemic planning.  To accomplish the collective goal, the new 
partnership must develop relationships that will induce trust, improve collective 
capabilities, provide mutual advocacy, and embrace a culture of collaboration.  Pandemic 
planning efforts among all partners must be consistent, comprehensive, and mutual.  The 
                                                 
117 “Preparing for Pandemic Influenza – A personal and family guide,” Washington State Department 
of  Health pamphlet. DOH Publication number 820-029. 2006: 1-5.  
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efforts of this collaborative enterprise must focus on enhancing information sharing, 
especially regarding best practices, to capitalize on their momentum.  
As a precursor to an elaborate and potentially protracted process, consideration 
must be given to what the invigorated pandemic planning process will cost.  Another 
perspective would recognize this effort as an investment vice an expense, especially in 
terms of national preparedness in advance of a potential wide-scale catastrophe. 
Investment in continued development of an effective national pandemic plan would pay 
long-term benefits in the nation’s ability to confront and recover from a multitude of 
natural and human-caused disasters.  With hundreds of millions of dollars spent on 
pandemic planning and preparedness over the past four years, an argument can be made 
that we have spent enough.  
With the ultimate goal of saving lives, reducing suffering, minimizing the 
economic impact, and facilitating a rapid return to the pre-pandemic norm, pandemic 
influenza planning must be done with deliberation, professionalism, consistency, and 
attention to detail across many disciplines.  As a nation, we have already invested deeply 
in pandemic influenza planning and preparedness, yet a gapping hole still exists. With 
proper sponsorship and a collaborative investment of time and talent, we can produce an 
effective national pandemic plan that would serve to provide all the strategic disaster   
preparedness goals already in place.  Indeed, with today’s technology and a collaborative 
spirit, a properly motivated community of interest could effectively develop a one-stop, 
comprehensive pandemic planning guide with national applicability.  The results of this 
effort could also be shared among the international public health community, further 
benefiting pandemic planning actions among our allies and developing countries.  This 
comprehensive plan would also provide an effective blueprint that would be applicable 
across a wide spectrum of natural, accidental, and terrorist-induced disasters.  
When considering potential terrorists threats such as weaponized smallpox, 
anthrax, or a hemorrhagic agent, the energy and time expended in developing a 
comprehensive national pandemic plan are well spent, especially with the plan’s 
applicability toward an all-hazards event.  Focusing on the known deficiencies identified 
during the analysis of all pandemic plans, the comprehensive plan would target these 
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inadequacies to provide not only a superb pandemic plan, but also the basis for a robust 
public health all hazards disaster response plan.  Addressing the mortuary affairs 
deficiencies alone would be an enormous first step, as most jurisdictions consider ten to 
thirty casualties a significant event.  Facing the potential tens of hundreds to tens of 
thousands of deaths within individual states during a national catastrophic event is not 
only unprecedented, but sure to overwhelm local response and recovery capabilities. 
There are many more facets of a comprehensive national pandemic plan that would 
benefit the public health response domain, but the aforementioned mortuary affairs 
functional issues highlight the need for further investigation throughout all functional 
areas. Another application of this comprehensive plan would be its application as the 
malleable blueprint for a generic, all-domain response-planning template. While 
substantive collaboration would be required to achieve this initiative, the value added to 
our national preparedness posture is immeasurable.  
The further development and nurturing of a comprehensive pandemic plan 
requires strong executive agency sponsorship.  Why not start at the top of the federal 
government? The new White House leadership team must quickly discern which critical 
issues to tackle and prioritize these challenges according to the level of threat to the 
nation. Continuing with the Democratic campaign promise of “change,” the timing is 
right for changing our approach to pandemic planning.  The change must go beyond 
merely addressing the known deficiencies; change must highlight the need for a 
collaborative, multi-disciplinary effort that bridges all echelons of government and 
reaches across all communities of interest.  It is fundamentally important to initiate a 
national, and not a federal, approach to resolving this issue to garner stakeholder buy-in 
across all echelons of participation, and action must be taken beyond socializing the 
current inadequacies in planning. Creating a comprehensive national pandemic plan, with 
potential international applicability, would increase our ability to respond to multiple 
challenges and threats involving large populations and vast geographical impacts.  Under 
the continued aegis of the Department of Health and Human Services, the renewed efforts 
for pandemic influenza planning must go beyond status quo rhetoric and become a 
primary goal of the current administration.  The collective message to the public resulting 
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from this effort must be honest, reassuring, positive, and proactive in order to reinforce 
and sustain public trust in the nation’s capabilities and the government’s determination to 
prevail over the perpetual pandemic threat. By garnering a partnership with communities 
of interest, instead of the usual approach of publishing federal edicts, HHS will provide 
the leadership that rightly owns not only the problem, but also the solution for effective 
strategic pandemic planning.  The new Secretary of HHS, Kathleen Sebelious, is in the 
enviable position of taking a fresh look at the totality of federal pandemic guidance and 
positively sculpting the national pandemic plan anew. There are few places where the 
efforts of so few planners could benefit so large a population, especially given the severe 
repercussions of failing to act at all. 
In closing, any planning process of this magnitude is complex and dynamic, but 
these facts should not deter a determined community from initiating a concerted, 
collaborative effort to surmount this challenge, especially given the dire consequences of 
ignoring the need.  As the American public has become more accustomed to relying on 
federal and state resources to recover from all disasters, the federal government must 
renew its focus on planning for the uncertainties surrounding a monumental mass 
casualty catastrophe to meet public expectation. A comprehensive national pandemic 
plan would go far in meeting that expectation. 
The American people depend on the planning efforts of organized, highly 
functional government at all levels, and must have confidence and trust in the 
mechanisms enacted to protect, defend, and recover from a pandemic catastrophe; they 
are owed nothing less. 
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